More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (August 2019) by Hall, Todd
The Scholar
Todd Hall
More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
11
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are presently the focus of a 
dangerous contest between the People’s Republic of China and 
Japan, one that even now has the potential to spark a military 
conflict that could draw in the United States. How has this come 
about? Whether seen from a strategic, economic, or historical 
perspective, the value of the islands does not appear to merit 
the risks of such a contest. Consequently, what has driven the 
escalation is not anything particular to the islands themselves, 
but rather the increasing symbolic stakes attached to them, their 
role within the domestic politics of both sides, and the measures 
each side has taken to shore up its respective claims. 
1  For the purposes of this piece, uses of the term “China” post-1949 shall refer to the People’s Republic of China. 
2  The Japanese name for the islands is “Senkakushotō,” while the People’s Republic of China uses “Diaoyudao”; for the purposes of neutrality, 
this piece uses “Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.” A “contiguous zone,” as defined by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, consists of 
the waters extending not more than 24 nautical miles “from the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured” in which 
states may “exercise the control necessary to (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within 
its territory or territorial sea; [and] (b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territory or territorial sea.” See: 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, accessed on July 9, 2019, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/
unclos_e.pdf.
3  This account is reconstructed from contemporary reporting and interviews with anonymous Japanese officials. For Japanese news reports, see: 
“Senkaku ni gunkan, mimei no kinpaku,” [Chinese warship near Senkaku, early morning tension], Asahi Shimbun, June 9, 2016, Morning Edition, 2; 
“Senkaku setsuzoku suiiki ni Chūgoku gunkan,” [Chinese warship in Senkaku contiguous zone], Yomiuri Shimbun, June 9, 2016, 1; “Senkaku setsuzoku 
suiiki ni Chūgoku gunkan,” [Chinese warship in Senkaku contiguous zone], Mainichi Shimbun, June 10, 2016. 
4  Vice Minister Saiki Akitaka, author’s interview, Tokyo, July 14, 2017. Subsequent analysis suggested the People’s Liberation Army Navy was not 
engaged in a planned provocation, but rather reacting to Russian warships transiting the contiguous zone from the south, returning to Vladivostok. 
See, “Chūgoku gunkan ga Senkaku shūhen no setsuzoku suiiki-hairi…” [Chinese warship enters contiguous zone around Senkaku…], Reuters, June 
9, 2016, https://jp.reuters.com/article/china-frigate-senkaku-idJPKCN0YU2NF; Some, however, suggested Sino-Russian collusion. See, “Senkaku 
setsuzoku suiiki ni Chūgoku gunkan,” [Chinese warship in Senkaku contiguous zone], Mainichi Shimbun, June 10, 2016.
A t 00:50 on June 9, 2016, in the East China Sea, a frigate belonging to the Chinese navy1 entered the contiguous zone surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands on a course toward the islands’ territorial 
waters.2 While ships belonging to various Chinese 
agencies had entered both the contiguous zone and 
the territorial waters around the islands in the past, 
this was a first for a Chinese naval vessel. A Japanese 
Self Defense Forces destroyer following the vessel’s 
movements hailed it, advising it to change course — 
to no avail. Meanwhile, in Tokyo, a team assembled 
inside the crisis management center of the prime 
minister’s office to monitor the situation. In the 
early hours of the morning, the Chinese ambassador 
was summoned to the Japanese Foreign Ministry, 
where Vice Minister Saiki Akitaka met him with a 
demand for the vessel’s immediate withdrawal. 
While declining to formally accept this demand, 
the ambassador conveyed that escalation was 
undesirable and that he would report back to Beijing. 
The Chinese naval vessel subsequently exited the 
contiguous zone at 03:10.3 
Unlike previous “white-on-white” engagements 
— a label denoting the color of the ships’ hulls 
— between the Japanese Coast Guard and non-
military Chinese vessels, this incident held the 
potential of becoming a dangerous “gray-on-gray” 
military showdown. Had the Chinese naval ship 
entered the islands’ territorial waters, it is highly 
conceivable that the Japanese government would 
have authorized the Japanese Self Defense Forces 
to employ force. Saiki would later reflect that there 
was real concern at the time that the situation would 
escalate into a serious confrontation between the 
Chinese and the Japanese forces.4 The tensions of 
that night reflect the stakes involved: Intentionally 
or unintentionally, actions by either side could 
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have sparked a military escalation involving the 
world’s three largest economies. 
Consisting of five core islands and a number of 
other minor features, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
are claimed by Japan, the People’s Republic of China, 
and Taiwan.5 Although Japan has administered 
the islands since 1972 — when the United States 
transferred control — and continues to maintain 
that no dispute exists, its position has increasingly 
been challenged by the presence of official Chinese 
vessels in the islands’ adjacent waters.6 The United 
States, while not taking a stance on the sovereignty 
of the islands, nevertheless has committed itself 
to come to Japan’s defense should it be attacked 
in the exercise of its administrative control.7 The 
islands thus constitute a potentially dangerous 
flashpoint in East Asia, highlighted by a number of 
analyses as a possible trigger for armed conflict — 
if not war — in the region.8
My goal in this paper is to supply an evidence-
based, theoretically informed account of recent 
developments in the contest over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands. To do so, I draw upon primary 
and secondary source material in Japanese and 
Chinese, as well as extensive interviews in both 
countries. I argue that, objectively speaking — 
apart from the mere fact that the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
are tangible features in the East China Sea to which 
Tokyo and Beijing both lay claim — the particular 
details of the disputed islands in themselves are by 
and large irrelevant. 
Rather, to explain why the islands have become 
the flashpoint they are today, we must look at how 
their significance within Sino-Japanese relations 
has grown in ways that have little to do with their 
actual, inherent value. Specifically, there are three 
important dimensions to the increased significance 
of the islands. The first dimension is symbolic. Since 
late 2010, the islands have increasingly become a 
proxy for an array of latent and newly emerging 
intangible concerns, frustrations, resentments, 
and anxieties on both sides. These have given 
the islands import and salience by raising the 
perceived stakes involved. The second dimension 
is domestic. The emergence of an active contest 
over the islands generated both opportunities and 
vulnerabilities within the domestic political sphere 
of each state. At crucial moments, these domestic 
5  This paper focuses primarily on relations between Japan and the People’s Republic of China concerning the islands. Relations between Japan 
and Taiwan and between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China concerning the islands are outside the purview of this article.
6  See, “Senkaku Islands Q&A,” Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 13, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/qa_1010.html.
7  Mark Manyin, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: US Treaty Obligations (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2016).
8  Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017), 176–78; 
Michael McDevitt, Senkaku Islands Tabletop Exercise Report (Suffolk, Virginia: Sasakawa Peace Foundation USA, 2017); Eric Heginbotham and 
Richard J. Samuels, “Active Denial: Redesigning Japan’s Response to China’s Military Challenge,” International Security 42, no. 4 (Spring 2018): 148, 
https://doi.org/10.1162/isec_a_00313.
dynamics have raised the profile of the dispute 
and increased pressure on policymakers to take 
firmer action. The third dimension is competitive. 
The islands have become the concrete focus of an 
ongoing set of escalatory, interactive dynamics, 
in which actions taken by one side to improve its 
standing in the dispute elicit counter-measures 
from the other. These spiralling dynamics continue 
to play out across a variety of domains and remain 
a source of further potential conflict. 
In brief, since late 2010 the islands have increased 
in significance as a symbol, as a domestic political 
football, and as an object of ongoing, competitive 
jockeying. Existing work has highlighted certain 
aspects of these roles in isolation, but I argue that 
we must view them as the interwoven pieces of a 
whole. The islands became increasingly salient as 
a domestic political issue in no small part because 
of their growing symbolic significance. But at the 
same time, the symbolic import of the islands 
benefitted immensely from being championed by 
domestic politicians, activists, and others who 
latched onto the issue, whether opportunistically 
or out of sincere conviction. As the island’s 
symbolic and domestic political importance rose, 
so too did the respective pressures on the leaders 
managing the contest to take stronger action. 
This set in motion competitive spirals of move 
and counter-move between Tokyo and Beijing. 
The friction this generated has, in turn, helped 
to further feed into the islands’ symbolic and 
domestic political significance. The different facets 
of the islands’ increasing significance are therefore 
closely interconnected. 
This paper proceeds in six parts. First, it lays out why 
the escalation over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands since 
2010 is so puzzling. Second, it investigates arguments 
concerning the material value of the islands. Third, it 
examines the potential non-material value attached 
to the islands before 2010. Fourth, it evaluates the 
possibility that leaders on either side actively sought 
to initiate the dispute for self-interested reasons. 
Fifth, it offers an alternative explanation, arguing 
that we need to examine the increasing significance 
of the islands within Sino-Japanese relations with a 
focus on three dimensions. Finally, it concludes by 
considering potential paths forward.
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The Puzzle of Escalation
Prior to 2010, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were 
a relatively peripheral issue in Sino-Japanese 
relations. On Sept. 7, 2010, however, a Chinese fishing 
trawler collided with Japanese Coast Guard ships 
in the waters surrounding the islands, resulting 
in the Japanese detention of the ship and crew 
and the arrest of 
the captain. This 
spiraled into a major 
diplomatic incident, 
as Beijing applied 
increasing pressure 
on Japan for their 
return. Japan first 
released the ship 
and crew, and then 
eventually also the 
captain, after which 
tensions subsided. 
But in 2012, tensions reignited when — despite 
Beijing’s objections — the Japanese government 
chose to preempt an initiative by the nationalist 
mayor of Tokyo to buy several of the islands from 
a private owner by purchasing the islands itself. 
This unleashed a new round of conflict involving 
popular protests and official tensions. As Sheila 
Smith has written, “Until 2010, what had largely 
been perceived as a manageable difference between 
Tokyo and Beijing, of interest only to small groups of 
nationalist activists in both countries, had blown up 
into a major confrontation between the two states.”9 
The 2010 collision and subsequent 2012 purchase 
were thus decisive turning points in the nature of 
the Sino-Japanese dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands. This is evidenced by substantial shifts in 
the official and popular prominence of the dispute. 
Consider the attention the islands have received 
from the People’s Daily, the Chinese government’s 
official mouthpiece: Only 16 articles referenced the 
islands in the five years before the 2010 collision 
9  Sheila A. Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 190.
10  Full-text search of People’s Daily articles for “钓鱼岛” comparing the period between Sept. 6, 2005, and Sept. 6, 2010, to the period between 
Sept. 7, 2010, and Sept. 7, 2015. For longer-term analysis showing a similar trend, see, Yasuhiro Matsuda, “How to Understand China’s Assertiveness 
since 2009: Hypotheses and Policy Implications,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Strategic Japan, April 2014, 4.
11  Yasuo Nakauchi, “Ryōdo O Meguru Mondai to Nihon Gaikō ― 2010-Nen Ikō No Ugoki to Kokkai Rongi” [Territorial issues and Japanese 
diplomacy — Developments after 2010 and Parliamentary Debate], Rippō to chōsa, 342 (2017): 3.
12  Baidu Zhishu query for the personal computer search history data for “钓鱼岛,” using
http://index.baidu.com/ (Baidu account necessary for use) accessed July 12, 2018. Interestingly, closely tracking this was searches for “钓鱼岛地图” 
(Diaoyu Islands map) suggesting many people were trying to locate the islands. 
13  Google Trends query for “尖閣” search history in Japan,
https://trends.google.com/trends/explore?date=all&geo=JP&q=尖閣, accessed Aug. 7, 2018. Notably, the most interest appears in November 2010, 
ostensibly due to the video scandal discussed below.
14  See, “Trends in Chinese Government and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan’s Response,” Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 8, 2018, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page23e_000021.html; “China’s Activities Surrounding Japan’s Airspace,” 
Ministry of Defense of Japan, accessed June 26, 2018, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/ryouku/.
compared to 312 in the five years after.10 In Japanese 
officialdom, that these events marked turning 
points in the dispute is evidenced by parliamentary 
references: As one study demonstrates, 2010 
marked a watershed for the islands’ salience within 
parliamentary debates, with mentions increasing 
exponentially over previous years.11 As for the 
popular prominence of the dispute, the Chinese 
search engine, Baidu, shows few online searches 
for the islands in the five years prior to 2010. In 
September 2010, there was a sudden burst in 
Chinese interest, which was subsequently dwarfed 
in 2012 with searches increasing nearly six-fold.12 
In Japan, Google Trends shows little interest in 
the islands in the years before the 2010 incident as 
well. Interest first shot up massively in 2010 and 
then again in 2012.13 
Seven years on, the prominence of the dispute 
has subsided somewhat; however, the situation 
in the waters around the islands remains a far 
cry from the status quo ante. Since 2012, official 
Chinese maritime vessels have conducted regular 
incursions into the islands’ territorial waters, and 
official Chinese aircraft have repeatedly appeared 
in the airspace above them.14 In 2013, Beijing 
announced an Air Defense Identification Zone 
including the airspace over the islands, raising 
the risk of aerial confrontation. Though there 
has been progress since then — most notably a 
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maritime communication mechanism between 
the Japanese Self Defense Forces and the People’s 
Liberation Army15 — as well as a more general 
improvement in the tone of relations, the area 
around the islands has become more crowded and 
the possibility for serious conflict remains. 
The above broadly describes what happened, 
but not why. Looking to the existing literature on 
territorial disputes, one approach to seeking an 
explanation would be to ask what it is about the 
contested islands’ material value — be it strategic 
or economic — that has motivated such tensions. 
Another approach would be to examine the islands’ 
preexisting non-material value — religious, ethnic, 
or historical. A third approach would be to adopt a 
cynical perspective, investigating the potential of a 
“wag-the-dog” scenario in which the governments 
involved intentionally initiated the dispute to 
distract from domestic concerns or, alternately, to 
gain bargaining leverage in other areas. 
This paper examines each of these explanations 
in turn and finds them wanting. The material 
value of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands is, at best, 
questionable. Nor does it explain why tensions 
did not begin until 2010. If anything, estimates of 
the islands’ economic value have been repeatedly 
adjusted downward. Regarding non-material 
value, the islands are uninhabited and host no 
sites of major religious or ethnic meaning. If there 
have been revisions to their perceived historical 
significance, these have arguably occurred as a 
function of post-2010 developments. And lastly, 
all available evidence suggests neither side was 
initially seeking escalation. The following three 
sections lay out these findings in detail, leaving the 
developments in the years since 2010 a mystery.
15  “Japan, China Launch Maritime-Aerial Communication Mechanism,” Mainichi Shinbun, June 8, 2018, https://mainichi.jp/english/
articles/20180608/p2a/00m/0na/002000c.
16  Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, Territorial Changes and International Conflict (New York: Routledge, 2002), 14–18; Paul Diehl, A Road Map to War: 
Territorial Dimensions of International Conflict (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1999), x–xi; Monica Duffy Toft, “Territory and War,” Journal 
of Peace Research 51, no. 2 (2014): 187–89, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022343313515695; Paul Hensel, “Contentious Issues and World Politics: 
The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816–1992,” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 1 (March 2001): 81–109, https://doi.
org/10.1111/0020-8833.00183.
17  Li Ran, “Zhuanjia cheng riben kanzhong wo guo diaoyudao zhanlue jiazhi,” [Experts claim Japan is focused on the strategic value of our 
country’s Diaoyu Islands], Renmin Wang, July 7, 2012, http://world.people.com.cn/n/2012/0717/c115361-18534590.html; Akimoto Kazumine, 
“The Strategic Value of Territorial Islands from the Perspective of National Security,” Review of Island Studies, Oct. 9, 2013, https://www.spf.org/
islandstudies/research/a00008/.
18  Toshi Yoshihara, “China’s Vision of Its Seascape: The First Island Chain and Chinese Seapower,” Asian Politics and Policy 4, no. 3 (July 2012): 
293–314, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1943-0787.2012.01349.x.
19  Measured from Taisho-jima/Chiweiyu.
The Question of Material Value
A number of existing approaches explain 
territorial disputes according to the tangible 
benefits possession of a disputed territory can 
supply. These include strategic advantage, natural 
resources, control of trade routes, an increased 
population or tax base, or extra land to settle.16 
Given that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are small 
and uninhabited, most material arguments have 
focused on their strategic or economic value. 
Strategic Value
One argument for the strategic value of the 
islands is that possessing them would aid the 
Chinese military in breaking through the first 
island chain separating continental China from the 
Pacific Ocean. Alternately, were Japanese forces 
to possess them, it would help prevent a Chinese 
military breakthrough.17 The first island chain 
stretches from the Korean peninsula southward 
across the Japanese Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, 
and beyond to the Philippines.18 The Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands are located inside this island chain, 
northeast of Taiwan on the western edge of the 
Okinawa Trough. 
But while nearer to the first island chain than the 
Chinese continental coastline, the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands are, at their closest, still at least 60 miles 
(100 km) away from any feature in the chain.19 
Consequently, even if the People’s Republic of China 
possessed the islands, penetrating Japanese-held 
sections of the chain would still require Chinese 
military vessels to transit a considerable distance 
and pass through one of several bottlenecks, 
most prominently the Miyako Strait, between 
the Japanese islands of Okinawa and Miyako. 
These islands already house formidable Japanese 
military capabilities, including mobile, surface-to-
ship missiles covering the strait’s entrance, and a 
submarine sound-surveillance system extending 
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along the Ryuku archipelago.20 Apart from mobile, 
land-based missiles stationed across the chain, 
Japan can also deploy guided-missile patrol boats, 
submarines, and even mines to block critical 
passageways.21 Correspondingly, Japan does not 
need control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands to 
obstruct the Chinese navy’s movement through its 
portion of the first island chain. Therefore, as one 
analyst has noted, to break through the chain the 
Chinese military would likely attempt capturing 
islands such as Miyako and Ishigaki for control of 
the strait that lies between them.22 Certainly, Japan 
could do more to increase its defenses on these 
islands.23 But taking them remains a daunting task 
involving the long-distance transport of an invasion 
force. Chinese possession of the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands would not markedly change that fact. 
A second argument for the strategic value of 
the islands is that they would provide a platform 
for placing strategically useful assets — such as 
radar installations or missiles — closer to either 
the island chain or the Chinese continental 
coastline, respectively, as well as nearby sea lines 
of communication.24 And yet, such an advantage 
would be marginal at best. For one, anything placed 
on the islands would be highly vulnerable. Only 
one of the islands — Uotsuri/Diaoyu Island — has 
a surface area greater than half a square mile (or 
1 sq km). But at less than 1.4 square miles (3.6 sq 
km.) it is just “a bit larger than New York City’s 
Central Park.”25 Accordingly, the islands have scant 
space to hide assets or develop redundancies. In a 
conflict scenario, assets on the islands would offer 
easily identifiable targets unlikely to survive an 
opening salvo.26 Moreover, the islands are relatively 
20  Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter, Tools of Owatatsumi: Japan’s Ocean Surveillance and Costal Defence Capabilities (Canberra: Australian 
National University Press, 2015), 11, 103.
21  Toshi Yoshihara, “Sino-Japanese Rivalry at Sea: How Tokyo Can Go Anti-Access on China,” Orbis 59, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 69–71, https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.orbis.2014.11.006.
22  Yoshihara, “China’s Vision of Its Seascape,” 306–07.
23  Heginbotham and Samuels, “Active Denial.”
24  Taylor Fravel and Alexander Liebman, “Beyond the Moat: The Plan’s Evolving Interests and Potential Influence,” in The Chinese Navy: Expanding 
Capabilities, Evolving Roles, ed. Saunders, et al. (Washington, DC: CreateSpace, 2011), 53–54; Zhu Fenglan, “21 Shijichu De Riben Haiyang Zhanlue,” 
in Yatai Diqu Fazhan Baogao, ed. Zhang Yunling and Sun Shihai (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2006), 249. 
25  For the dimensions, see, “The Senkaku Islands: Location, Area, and Other Geographical Data,” Review of Island Studies, Feb. 17, 2015, https://
www.spf.org/islandstudies/info_library/senkaku-islands/02-geography/02_geo001.html; for the quote, see Manyin, “Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) 
Islands Dispute,” 1.
26  Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, US Airsea Battle, and Command of 
the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1 (Summer 2016): 7–48, https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00249.
27  Anonymous interviews, Japanese Self Defense Force officials, Tokyo, April–May 2017.
28  Anonymous interview, former Japanese Defense Ministry official, May 2017.
29  Biddle and Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western Pacific,” 23–24.
30  Retired Vice Admiral Yoji Koda, author’s interview, Tokyo, April 19, 2017.
31  “Occupation and Island Building,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative, https://amti.csis.org/
island-tracker/.
isolated: They are over 60 miles (100 km) from 
either the nearest Japanese islands or Taiwan and 
more than 180 miles (300 km) from the Chinese 
mainland. Resupply under combat conditions 
would pose major logistical difficulties.27 What is 
more, such capabilities can be placed elsewhere. 
To cite a former Japanese defense official, “you 
could get the same result from putting radar on 
the Senkaku as from putting it nearby on a ship, 
or, alternately, by flying AWACS [Airborne Warning 
And Control Systems] you could get information 
from farther away.”28 Not only do ship-mounted 
and airborne capabilities have the advantages 
of mobility, the latter also have the advantage of 
altitude, providing a much farther radar horizon.29 
So, while the strategic value of the islands is not 
zero, it is quite low. According to one former 
Japanese vice admiral, they are “just junk rocks, no 
strategic value.”30 
Still, one could argue that Beijing’s behavior 
in the South China Sea — including fortifying 
tiny features with military hardware despite 
international condemnation — demonstrates 
the value it places on such outposts. There 
are, however, several crucial differences. First, 
compared to the relatively isolated Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands, the outposts built by the People’s 
Republic of China in the South China Sea sit 
within a crowded cluster of contested features, 
where other claimants have already competitively 
established military footholds to cement their 
position.31 Second, while Chinese military assets 
on these small outposts are similarly vulnerable 
to U.S. attack, they nevertheless offer intimidating 
advantages against less well-equipped competitors 
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In short, although potential 
oil and gas resources may 
have initially generated 
an interest in the islands 
decades ago,  it currently 
remains unclear what 
resources actually lie in the 
surrounding seabed...
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in the South China Sea “whose navies barely rate 
as coast guards.”32 Placing assets on the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands would not grant such advantages 
with regards to Japan, a more formidable adversary. 
Lastly, to date, the People’s Republic of China 
has only militarized features in the South China 
Sea that it has already controlled for decades. 
Militarizing the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, however, 
would require first expelling Japan and risking a 
wider conflagration with the United States. In this 
regard alone, the potential strategic value of the 
islands pales in contrast to the costs and dangers 
of such a confrontation, even assuming the Chinese 
military were to prevail. Nor would preventing 
Japan from militarizing the islands stop the latter 
from shifting capabilities westward. In fact, Japan 
has already moved assets westward by stationing a 
defense facility, complete with radar, to the south 
of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands on another island, 
Yonaguni.33 All said, it is difficult to argue that the 
marginal strategic benefit the islands would offer 
either side justifies risking war to obtain them. 
Economic Value?
But what of their economic value? A central 
factor is the potential 200-nautical-mile exclusive 
economic zone entitlements assumed to be 
conferred on the state with sovereign rights to 
these islands under the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea. Given overlapping claims, 
one study has calculated that potentially 19,800 
square nautical miles of exclusive economic zone 
entitlements are at stake.34
These entitlements are seen as valuable primarily 
due to a 1969 U.N. Economic Commission for Asia 
and the Far East report, which suggested the 
area “may be one of the most prolific oil reserves 
in the world.”35 Importantly, the report failed to 
32  James Holmes and Toshi Yoshihara, “Five Shades of Chinese Gray-Zone Strategy,” National Interest, May 2, 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/
feature/five-shades-chinese-gray-zone-strategy-20450.
33  Ball and Tanter, Tools of Owatatsumi, 22–27.
34  Victor Prescott and Clive Schofield, The Maritime Political Boundaries of the World (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2005), 436–39.
35  Cited in James Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters: China, Japan, and Maritime Order in the East China Sea (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
University Press, 2014), 43.
36   Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, 44.
37  See, for instance, Caihua Ma et al., “Diaoyudao Ziyuan Jiazhi Tanjiu “ [Study of the resource value of the Diaoyu Islands], Zhongguo Yuye JIngji, 
no. 6 (2012): 126.
38  See Lengcui Fei, “Diaoyudao Daodi Cangle Duoshao Shiyou?” [How much oil do the Diaoyu Islands really contain?], Qingnian yu Shehui, no. 11 
(2012): 34; for the original, see, “Japan Will Press Efforts to Exploit Major Oil Find,” New York Times, Sept. 1, 1969, 2.
39  Qian Song, “Haiyang Shiyou--Shiyou Shengchan Zengzhang De Qianli Suozai “ [Offshore oil- the potential for growth in oil production], 
Zhongguo shiyou he huagong jingji fenxi, no. 2 (2006): 46.
40  “East China Sea,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, Sept. 17, 2014, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/regions-topics.
php?RegionTopicID=ECS.
41  Anonymous interview, Beijing, July 2018.
confirm actual reserves, only hypothesizing their 
existence given the area’s geological structure. At 
the time of the report’s release, Taiwan and Japan 
(both claimants) entered into joint development 
negotiations; however, these ended in 1970 when 
the People’s Republic of China voiced objections.36 
Since then, there has been no exploratory drilling, 
due to the contested nature of the area, and thus 
the actual presence of oil and gas reserves remains 
unsubstantiated.
Nevertheless, this has not stopped speculation. 
One figure for the fossil fuel prospects of the entire 
East China Sea that has frequently appeared in 
Chinese academic writings is 109.5 billion barrels.37 
This number, however, is of apparently dubious 
provenance, allegedly stemming from a 1969 New 
York Times article in which a Japanese official 
quotes findings from the U.N. report. The report, 
however, contains no such number.38 Another 
common figure is 3 to 7 billion tons — purportedly 
put forward by official Chinese experts in 1982 
without any hard evidence.39 Other similarly high 
Chinese estimates exist, but as a U.S. Energy 
Information Administration report notes, they 
remain without corroboration and “do not take 
into account economic factors relevant to bring 
them to production.”40 In fact, one source from a 
major Chinese oil company confided that “inside 
the [Chinese] oil industry, you do not hear anyone 
making big claims about oil and gas around the 
islands these days, especially given the limited 
findings in other parts of the East China Sea.”41
Indeed, other recent estimates are more 
conservative. In 2006, one Japanese official 
estimated oil and gas reserves on Japan’s side 
of its self-proclaimed East China Sea median 
line — including potential Senkaku/Diaoyu 
entitlements — at approximately 500 million kilo-
liters, equivalent to less than a year’s worth of 
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Chinese consumption at 2015 levels.42 The Energy 
Information Administration has estimated “proved 
and probable reserves” in the entire East China Sea 
at approximately “200 million barrels of oil” and 
“between 1 and 2 trillion cubic feet” of natural gas.43 
At China’s 2015 consumption levels, that equals 
just 16 days’ worth of oil and between 55 to 100 
days of natural gas.44 In short, although potential 
oil and gas resources may have initially generated 
an interest in the islands decades ago,  it currently 
remains unclear what resources actually lie in the 
surrounding seabed, and recent estimates have 
tended to decrease expectations significantly.45 
A second potential source of economic value is 
the fishing resources around the islands. At present, 
under a 1997 agreement, each side has agreed not 
to enforce its laws on the “nationals and fishing 
vessels” of the other in the waters 12 nautical 
miles beyond the islands. The friction, however, is 
within the narrow 12-nautical-mile bands of water 
surrounding the islands. The Japanese government 
claims these as territorial waters to which the 1997 
agreement does not apply,46 and Chinese fishing 
boats thus face being chased off by the Japanese 
Coast Guard when approaching.47 These waters, 
however, constitute only a small fraction of the 
disputed East China Sea exclusive economic zone 
area. Moreover, due to over-fishing in the general 
area, the fishing stocks in these waters have 
declined precipitously in line with broader trends 
42  Diet Session 164, Sangiin gyōsei kanshi iinkai, April 24, 2006. Calculated based on consumption figures provided by the U.S. Energy Information 
Administration: “International Energy Statistics,” U.S. Energy Information Administration, accessed Feb. 12, 2018, https://www.eia.gov/beta/
international/data/browser/. 
43  “East China Sea.”
44  Calculated based on consumption figures provided by the U.S. Energy Information Administration: “International Energy Statistics,” U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, accessed Feb. 12, 2018, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/data/browser/. 
45  Paul O’Shea, “How Economic, Strategic, and Domestic Factors Shape Patterns of Conflict and Cooperation in the East China Sea Dispute,” Asian 
Survey 55, no. 3 (May/June 2015): 555–56, https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2015.55.3.548.
46  Nobukatsu Kanehara and Yutaka Arima, “New Fishing Order-Japan’s New Agreement on Fisheries with the Republic of Korea and with the 
People’s Republic of China,” Japanese Annual of International Law, no. 42 (1999): 27–28, https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/
jpyintl42&div=4&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals. 
47  Hirose Hajime, “Kaijōhoanchō Ni Yoru Senkaku Keibi No Rekishi” [A history of Japanese Coast Guard policing of the Senkaku], Sōsa kenkyū 65, 
no. 9 (2016).
48  Makomo Kuniyoshi, “Senkakushotō Ni Okeru Gyogyō No Rekishi to Genjō” [History and current state of Senkaku fisheries], Nippon Suisan 
Gakkasishi 77, no. 4 (2011): 707; Tseng Katherine Hui-yi, Lessons from the Disturbed Waters: The Diaoyu/Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands Disputes 
(Singapore: World Scientific, 2015), 75–78. Given that fish generally do not pay attention to borders, this is not surprising.
49  “Fuon’na ryōba/Senkaku” [Turbulent fishing grounds/Senkaku], Ryuku Shimpo, March 1, 2013, 3. 
50  Thomas Peacock and Matthew H. Alford, “Is Deep-Sea Mining Worth It?” Scientific American 318, no. 5 (May 2018): 72–77, https://www.
scientificamerican.com/article/the-race-is-on-to-mine-and-protect-the-deep-seafloor/; G.P. Glasby, “Deep Seabed Mining: Past Failures and Future 
Prospects,” Marine Georesources and Geotechnology 20, no. 2 (2002): 165, https://doi.org/10.1080/03608860290051859.
51  Nobuyuki Okamoto et al., “Current Status of Japan’s Activities for Deep-Sea Commercial Mining Campaign,” paper presented at the 2018 
OCEANS-MTS/IEEE Kobe Techno-Oceans (OTO), 2018.
52  Satoshi Ueda and Nobuyuki Okamoto, “Nihon Shūhen Kaiiki Ni Bunpu Suru Kaiteinessuikōshō No Kaihatsu Purojekuto No Gaiyō,” [The Overview 
of Project for Developing Seafloor Massive Sulfides in the EEZ of Japan (sic)], Journal of MMIJ no. 131 (2015).
53  And this would depend on the People’s Republic of China asserting an exclusive economic zone on the basis of sovereignty over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands, which it has not yet done. Such a claim on these resources, particularly those more northerly, would more likely be based on 
continental shelf entitlements. See, Mark J. Valencia, “The East China Sea Dispute: Context, Claims, Issues, and Possible Solutions,” Asian 
Perspective 31, no. 1 (2007): 139, https://www.jstor.org/stable/42704579. For the Chinese claim, see, “Submission by the People’s Republic of China 
Concerning the Outer Limits of the Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles in Part of the East China Sea,” United Nations Division for Ocean 
Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Dec. 14, 2012, https://www.un.org/Depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/chn63_12/executive summary_EN.pdf. 
in the East China Sea.48 This decline, together with 
factors including increasing fuel costs for travel to 
the islands, has put off many local Japanese fishers 
from traveling to the islands.49 
A third potential source of economic value is 
seabed mining, primarily of polymetallic manganese 
nodules or polymetallic sulfides.50 But polymetallic 
sulfides and economically viable concentrations of 
manganese nodules are generally limited to deeper 
waters, the former around underwater vents.51 In 
the East China Sea, the chief concentrations are in 
the depths of the Okinawa Trough, in the vicinity 
of undisputed Japanese islands in the Ryukyus.52 
The shallower waters of the continental shelf floor 
surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would 
thus appear to offer considerably less of potential 
value, while sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands would make only a relatively minor 
difference for claims in deeper waters.53  
There is a further issue concerning the economic 
value of the islands: Settling the question of 
sovereignty over them would still leave unresolved 
the problem of who is entitled to the resources 
in and below their surrounding waters. Granted, 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea, the state with undisputed sovereignty over 
the islands would have claim to 12 nautical miles of 
territorial waters around each of the features above 
water at high tide. But as noted above, many of the 
resources under dispute lie outside these narrow 
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confines and thus ownership would depend on 
further exclusive economic zone entitlements.54 
And yet, it is far from certain an international 
court or arbitral tribunal would grant the Senkaku/
Diaoyu exclusive economic zone entitlements. 
Specifically, to qualify for an exclusive economic 
zone or continental shelf entitlement, the features 
in question need to be capable of sustaining human 
habitation or economic life of their own.55 Given the 
stringency with which the 2016 Permanent Court 
of Arbitration ruling applied this requirement to 
the South China Sea, it is questionable whether the 
small, uninhabited Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would 
qualify.56 
Let us assume, nevertheless, that one or more of 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu features were found to meet 
the legal requirements for generating an exclusive 
economic zone entitlement. In negotiations or 
judicial proceedings to allocate exclusive economic 
zones between claimants in the East China Sea, 
such an entitlement might still only receive 
reduced consideration or be wholly discounted 
due to a variety of factors.  These include the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands’ relatively small size, lack 
of population and economic activity, and distance 
from other features.57 Even if the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands’ entitlements to an exclusive economic zone 
were granted full effect in the process of drawing 
borders, they would still need to be weighed against 
all the other potential exclusive economic zone 
and continental shelf entitlements that extend 
from Taiwan, continental China, and the Japanese 
archipelago and also require consideration. 
With all these overlapping entitlements, the final 
determination of the exclusive economic zone 
boundaries in the East China Sea is far from 
straightforward. Given that the processes of 
negotiation or third-party arbitration pertaining 
to maritime borders is highly complicated and 
unpredictable, the actual benefits to be reaped 
54  Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, “International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands,” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law, 
no. 29 (2007): 931, https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/upjiel29&div=27&g_sent=1&casa_token=&collection=journals.
55  See, Article 121, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, accessed on July 9, 2019, https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_
agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.
56  The requirement was clarified as, “the objective capacity of a feature, in its natural condition, to sustain either a stable community of people or 
economic activity that is not dependent on outside resources or purely extractive in nature.” See,  “The South China Sea Arbitration (the Republic 
of the Philippines V. The People’s Republic of China),” Permanent Court of Arbitration Press Release, The Hague, July 12, 2016, https://pca-cpa.org/
en/news/pca-press-release-the-south-china-sea-arbitration-the-republic-of-the-philippines-v-the-peoples-republic-of-china/; Manyin, “Senkaku 
(Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute,” 1. 
57  Clive Schofield, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? Progress and Challenges in the Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries since the Drafting of 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,” in 30 Years of UNCLOS (1982-2012): Progress and Prospects, Guifang Xue and Ashley White 
(Beijing: China Universtiy of Political Science and Law Press, 2013).
58  Ramos-Mrosovsky, “International Law’s Unhelpful Role in the Senkaku Islands,” 907.
59  Former Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda, author’s interview, Tokyo, July 10, 2017.
60  Yuan Luo, “Diaoyudao Bu Shi Wuzuqingzhong De ‘Huangdao,’” Huanqui Shibao, Sept. 4, 2012.
61  Andrew Chubb, “Propaganda, Not Policy: Explaining the PLA’s Hawkish Faction (Part One),” China Brief 13, no. 15 (2013), https://jamestown.
org/program/propaganda-not-policy-explaining-the-plas-hawkish-faction-part-one/.
from having sovereignty over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands when entering into such proceedings are 
very uncertain and possibly quite trivial. This also 
assumes such proceedings would even occur. As 
one legal scholar notes, “the unpredictability of 
litigation, the probable domestic illegitimacy of any 
adverse result, and the lack of any means short of 
force to enforce a judgment all work to discourage 
litigation or arbitration.”58 
Evaluating Material Motives
Asked in 2016 if the islands have strategic or 
economic value, former Japanese Prime Minister 
Yasuo Fukuda replied, “No, no, using all that petrol 
for patrols … I think it is a waste.”59 Strategically, 
the islands are isolated and easily targeted, 
and attempting to militarize them would entail 
substantial risk for marginal advantage. The fishing 
stocks are in decline while potential oil and gas 
reserves remain unconfirmed and have repeatedly 
been re-estimated as lower than previously 
thought. Moreover, it remains uncertain what — 
if any — advantage sovereignty over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands would provide in negotiations 
or judicial proceedings over the delimitation of 
maritime resource entitlements, should these ever 
even occur. 
Nevertheless, one could argue it is perceptions, 
not the actual value, that matter. Policymakers may, 
after all, still be driven by perceived material aims. 
For instance, retired Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan claims 
the islands are “treasure islands” and have “great 
geostrategic significance.”60 But we should be 
careful in taking such publicly presented rationales 
at face value, particularly when they come from 
Chinese military hawks who are active in public 
affairs.61 In truth, if Beijing’s aim is installing 
stationary military outposts in the East China Sea, 
it has easier options. In fact, having already built 
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several oil and gas rigs in the East China Sea further 
to the north, abutting the Japanese-demarcated 
median line, the Chinese government could erect 
more such structures to the south, along its side of 
the median line near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
and adjacent important sea lanes. Such rigs can 
host radar and missile emplacements. Indeed, 
the Japanese side has already accused Beijing of 
installing military-use radar on its northerly rigs.62 
If Beijing desires a tripwire between Japan and 
Taiwan, these could serve the purpose. 
Alternately, if the driving motive is economic, joint 
development would offer considerable gains over 
the status quo without the risk of costly conflict. 
In actuality, this may be the only feasible option for 
Tokyo, as underwater topography is unfavorable to 
unilateral Japanese development of what is likely to 
be natural gas.63 The Japanese government has itself 
admitted as much.64 Ironically, running a pipeline to 
the Chinese coast is far more feasible.65 One might 
argue it still makes sense for Japan to defend its 
claim in order to prevent China from taking all the 
spoils. But Beijing has already, on multiple occasions, 
proposed joint development while shelving the 
sovereignty issue.66 Admittedly, such cooperation 
would require ironing out many details. And yet, 
there are successful precedents: In 1974, Japan and 
the Republic of Korea agreed to jointly develop 
highly anticipated petroleum deposits in waters 
where both shared overlapping claims, although 
they subsequently found little of value.67 
It is extraordinarily difficult to prove a negative. 
Yet, if the core motives for escalating the contest 
over the islands were material, we should have 
expected the protagonists to act in ways that 
maximize advantages or gains in these categories. 
That we have not, and the prominence of the 
dispute has increased even while the islands’ 
62  Ankit Panda, “A New Chinese Threat in the East China Sea? Not So Fast,” The Diplomat, July 23, 2015, https://thediplomat.com/2015/07/a-
new-chinese-threat-in-the-east-china-sea-not-so-fast/.
63  Rongxing Guo, Territorial Disputes and Seabed Petroleum Exploitation: Some Options for the East China Sea (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, September 2010), 9, 19, https://www.brookings.edu/research/territorial-disputes-and-seabed-petroleum-exploitation-some-options-for-
the-east-china-sea/; Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, 154.
64  “Sekō keizai sangyō daijin no kakugigo kishakaiken no gaiyō” [Press conference with METI Minister Sekō after Cabinet Meeting], Ministry of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry, Sept. 13, 2016, http://www.meti.go.jp/speeches/kaiken/2016/20160913001.html.
65  Guo, Territorial Disputes and Seabed Petroleum Exploitation, 19; Manicom, Bridging Troubled Waters, 154.
66  Reinhard Drifte, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Territorial Dispute Between Japan and China: Between the Materialization of the “China Threat,” 
UNISCI Discussion Papers 32, no. 32 (May 2013): 26, http://dx.doi.org/10.5209/rev_UNIS.2013.n32.44789; “Sangiin gyōsei kanshi iinkai,” Diet 
Session 164, April 24, 2006.
67  Clive Schofield and Ian Townsend-Gault, “Choppy Waters Ahead in ‘a Sea of Peace Cooperation and Friendship’?: Slow Progress Towards 
the Application of Maritime Joint Development to the East China Sea,” Marine Policy 35, no. 1 (2011): 28–29, https://econpapers.repec.org/
RePEc:eee:marpol:v:35:y:2011:i:1:p:25-33.
68  Diehl and Goertz, Territorial Changes and International Conflict, 19–20; Toft, “Territory and War,” 189.
69  “Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu shengming (1971 nian 12 yue 30 ri)” [Chinese People’s Republic Foreign Ministry Statement (1971 
December 30)],” Foreign Ministry of the People’s Republic of China, accessed April 5, 2018, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/diaoyudao/chn/flfg/zcfg/
t1304543.htm.
70  Akira Ishi et al., Nitchu Kokkou Seijouka, Nitchu Heiwa Yuukou Jouyaku Teiketsu Koushou [Concluding Negotiations for Sino-Japanese 
Normalization, the Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship] (Tokyo: Iwanami, 2010), 68.
economic value now appears less than originally 
thought, suggests other things at work. 
Non-material Value?
Another potential approach, also drawn from 
the literature on territorial disputes, would be to 
examine preexisting non-material factors, such 
as the historic or religious value of the contested 
space, or the ethnic heritage of its population.68 
The actual disagreement between Japan and the 
People’s Republic of China over the islands, however, 
is of relatively recent provenance, beginning 
when Beijing first publicly challenged Japanese 
sovereignty with its own claim in 1971.69 Before 
that, the islands had a relatively trivial existence: 
They had no religious or historic meaning of note, 
no Chinese citizens had ever lived there, and a 
Japanese fish-processing factory that had been 
there before the war had long been abandoned. 
At the time Beijing raised its claim, the islands 
were uninhabited, with several of them leased to 
the United States for target practice. Strikingly, in 
1972, when Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei 
brought up the islands with Chinese Premier Zhou 
Enlai during normalization negotiations, Zhou’s 
response was, “Because oil has emerged, that is 
why this is a problem.”70 It is, therefore, difficult 
to argue the islands possess any distant historical 
lineage of value. 
Even today, the islands remain nothing more 
than small, isolated, uninhabited features without 
any population, meaningful infrastructure, or 
sites of major religious or historical consequence. 
Critics might simply retreat to saying that territory 
is an issue of national sovereignty, and that 
regardless of their history, once both sides laid 
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claim to the islands they became a core national 
interest.71 Additionally, critics could also point to 
the overlapping claims to the islands advanced by 
Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China, thus 
linking the issue to the larger question of Chinese 
national unification. But even if one were to concede 
these points, they still do not explain the historic 
variation in how the dispute has unfolded within 
Sino-Japanese relations. General concerns over 
sovereignty fail to explain why certain territories 
might be valued more than others. Concerns 
over national sovereignty or unification are also 
longstanding and static and thus do little to explain 
how the willingness of both sides to risk conflict 
over the islands has changed over time.
There remains important historic variation that 
needs explaining, particularly between the nature 
of the dispute in the pre- and post-2010 periods. 
71  Alessio Patalano, “Seapower and Sino-Japanese Relations in the East China Sea,” Asian Affairs 45, no. 1 (2014): 37, https://doi.org/10.1080/03
068374.2013.876809. 
72  Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China’s Territorial Disputes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2008).
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74  Masato Tomebachi, Senkaku Wo Meguru “Gokai” Wo Toku [Resolving misunderstandings surrounding the Senkakus] (Tokyo: Nihon Kyōhōsha, 
2016), 92; Lili Zhang, Xin Zhongguo He Riben Guanxi Shi [History of Relations between Japan and the new China] (Shanghai: Renmin Chubanshe, 
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75  Tomebachi, Senkaku Wo Meguru “Gokai” Wo Toku, 16–17, 79–97; Taylor Fravel, “Explaining Stability in the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Dispute,” in Getting 
the Triangle Straight: Managing China-Japan-US Relations, ed. Gerald L. Curtis, Ryosei Kokuburn, and Jisi Wang (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2010).
76  Daniel Tretiak, “The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978: The Senkaku Incident Prelude,” Asian Survey 18, no. 12 (December 1978): 1235–49, https://
doi.org/10.2307/2643610.
77   Tretiak, “The Sino-Japanese Treaty of 1978, 1243; Hajime, “Kaijōhoanchō Ni Yoru Senkaku Keibi No Rekishi,” 114–16; Ryosei Kokubun et al., 
Nitchūkankeishi [History of Sino-Japanese Relations] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku Aruma, 2014), 133.
78  Mori Kazuko, Nitchū Hyōryū [Sino-Japanese Drift] (Tokyo: Iwatami Shinsho, 2017), 89, 215.
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80  Richard C. Bush, The Perils of Proximity: China-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2010), 74–75.
Prior to 2010, both sides had adopted a delaying 
strategy regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.72 
Indeed, in 1972 Zhou stated he did not want to 
discuss the dispute,73 and in 1978 Chinese leader 
Deng Xiaoping suggested shelving the issue for the 
next generation to solve.74 Neither actively sought 
to raise the dispute and were responding to its 
having been brought up by the Japanese side. And 
while Tokyo never publicly acknowledged — and 
in fact repeatedly denied — shelving the dispute, 
in practice, both countries subsequently worked 
to minimize the issue while Japan continued to 
exercise administrative control.75 
Admittedly, there were points of friction. In 
1978, when members of the ruling Japanese Liberal 
Democratic Party criticized their leadership for 
not leveraging Treaty of Peace and Friendship 
negotiations to get Beijing to cede its claim, 
hundreds of Chinese fishing ships appeared near 
the islands.76 The Chinese central government, 
however, later described the incident as 
“accidental,” generating speculation that this was 
the result of internal divisions over the treaty.77 In 
1992, the People’s Republic of China passed the 
Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 
which explicitly names the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
as its territory. This move was reportedly fiercely 
debated internally and done under pressure from 
the military.78 But as both Beijing and Tokyo were 
more focused on the Japanese emperor’s upcoming 
visit to China, there was limited fallout.79 In 2008, 
official Chinese ships entered the territorial waters 
around the islands for the first time.80 In light of 
other high-level efforts to improve relations at 
the time, including a Sino-Japanese East China 
Sea joint development agreement — concluded 
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despite internal Chinese opposition — some have 
attributed this to dissenting Chinese hardliners.81
More prominently, however, it was small activist 
groups on both sides that generated problems. In the 
1970s, the dispute had already galvanized “Protect 
the Diaoyu” groups in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the 
United States. In Japan, various nationalist groups 
also rallied to the cause, the most prominent being 
the Nihon Seinensha.82 Attempts by these actors 
to land on the islands, or alternately, in the case 
of Nihon Seinensha, advance the cause by building 
and registering lighthouses, constituted an ongoing 
irritant, particularly in the 1990s.83 Additionally, in 
2004, after multiple failed attempts, members of 
the mainland China-based “Chinese Federation 
for Defending the Diaoyu Islands” landed on one 
of the islands for the first time. In response, the 
Japanese government simply repatriated the 
Chinese activists back to the Chinese mainland. 
The government in Beijing, for its part, prevented 
further attempts by the group to travel to the 
islands.84 On the whole, both Tokyo and Beijing 
repeatedly worked to contain the impact of their 
activists: Beijing suppressed press coverage and 
prevented organized protests, while Tokyo refused 
to officially recognize the efforts of its nationalist 
groups and sought to limit their activities.85 
All in all, Japanese policy prior to 2010 could be 
summarized with the words of Japan’s foreign 
minister, Sonoda Sunao: “eschew provocative, 
propagandizing behavior … only carefully, calmly 
do what is necessary for domestic political needs.”86 
The policy of the People’s Republic of China, in 
turn, could, with few exceptions, be summed up in 
Chinese Vice Premier Gu Mu’s words: “[The Diaoyu 
Islands] have always been Chinese territory. … [W]
e can temporarily shelve the sovereignty issue. Let 
81  Mori Kazuko, Nitchū Hyōryū, 208–11. Miyamoto Yūji, former Japanese ambassador to the People’s Republic of China (2006–2010), author’s 
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82  Jinxing Chen, “Radicalization of the Protect Diaoyutai Movement in 1970s-America,” Journal of Chinese Overseas 5, no. 2 (2009); Smith, 
Intimate Rivals, 127–34, 212–17, https://doi.org/10.1163/179303909X12489373183055.
83  Erica Strecker Downs and Phillip C. Saunders, “Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands,” International Security 
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the later generations resolve it.”87 Erica Downs and 
Phillip Saunders argue that in the past this policy 
to contain the dispute was due to concerns about 
its possible impact on bilateral economic relations.88 
Given mainland China’s economic growth, one could 
suggest that economic relations with Japan are not 
currently as crucial to Beijing as they were when 
Downs and Saunders were writing. But the fact is 
that even now Japan still remains a major economic 
partner. As recently as 2017 Japan ranked as 
China’s third largest export destination and second 
largest import partner, as well as a key source 
of investment.89 Moreover, Taylor Fravel, writing 
in 2010, also noted a number of other reasons we 
should have expected both sides to avoid conflict, 
including the deterrent effect of U.S. commitments, 
the desire by both to maintain a regional reputation 
as “constructive and benign powers,” and the prior 
ability of all sides to manage the dispute.90 Given all 
these countervailing factors, an explanation is still 
needed for the substantial change that took place 
after the 2010 collision incident. 
Intentional Conflict?
A third potential explanation would be that 
the 2010 confrontation was intentional. One 
conceivable reason for deliberately provoking 
an escalation of the dispute would be to distract 
from internal issues and improve the domestic 
popularity of each country’s respective leadership, 
a position commonly advanced under the rubric 
of “diversionary war theory.”91 Another possibility 
is that the escalation demonstrates, as Krista 
Wiegand has argued, an intentional effort at “issue 
linkage” in which Beijing sought to use “the islands 
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dispute as bargaining leverage to gain concessions 
from Japan on other disputed issues.”92 
All available evidence, however, suggests the 
initial incident in 2010 was neither planned nor 
welcomed by either side. The trawler’s captain was 
reportedly intoxicated when arrested, and thus 
was not likely a covert Chinese agent.93 Though 
initially feted upon returning home to mainland 
China, he was subsequently forbidden to fish and 
subjected to a “soft” house arrest.94 Additionally, 
the Chinese government’s response — far from 
seeking to immediately leverage the incident — 
was restrained at first. Although protesting to the 
Japanese ambassador and canceling visits and 
East China Sea joint-development negotiations, 
in the first week after the captain’s arrest, Beijing 
suppressed protests and conveyed to Tokyo 
through back channels, “Somehow, please just get 
this settled without a fuss.”95 Only after the Japanese 
side decided to extend the detention of the fishing 
captain despite releasing the ship and crew did 
Beijing escalate its response. Chinese Premier Wen 
Jiabao publicly pressed for the captain’s release, 
reports emerged of an alleged Chinese embargo on 
rare-earth exports to Japan, and Beijing detained 
four Japanese citizens.96 Nothing here suggests an 
official Chinese conspiracy or reactive opportunism. 
In reality, Beijing was likely responding to an initially 
perceived loss: Tokyo had asserted its domestic law 
in the waters around the islands.97 
Neither would this seem to be a clever plot planned 
by the Japanese government. Maehara Seiji, the 
92  Krista Wiegand, Enduring Territorial Disputes: Strategies of Bargaining, Coercive Diplomacy, and Settlement (Athens, GA: University of Georgia 
Press, 2011), 98.
93  Smith, Intimate Rivals, 190.
94  “Senkaku oki shōtotsu jiken no chūgokujin senchō ga “jitaku nankin” jōtai, shutsugyo mo kinshi” [The Chinese captain from the Senkaku sea 
collision under ‘house arrest,’ also forbidden to fish], Searchina, May 24, 2011.
95  Citing a Japanese official, Tsuyoshi Sunohara, Antō: Senkaku Kokuyū-Ka [Secret Battle: The Senkaku Nationalization] (Tokyo: Shinchō bunko, 
2013), 23.
96  Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 23–26, https://
doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00115; Linus Hagström, “‘Power Shift’ in East Asia? A Critical Reappraisal of Narratives on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
Incident in 2010,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 5, no. 3 (Autumn 2012): 282–83, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pos011. Johnston disputes 
the embargo using Japanese import data. This, however, overlooks the pervasive “quasi-smuggling” on the People’s Republic of China side — many 
2010 rare earth exports were not classified as such when leaving the People’s Republic of China but registered in Japanese import data upon arrival. 
See, Nabeel A. Mancheri and Marukawa Tomoo, Rare Earth Elements: China and Japan in Industry, Trade and Value Chain (Tokyo: University of Tokyo 
Institute of Social Science, 2016), 159–60. At the time, multiple Japanese firms did report sudden stoppages, and officials from the People’s Republic 
of China reportedly confirmed the embargo to U.S. counterparts privately. See, Richard McGregor, Asia’s Reckoning: The Struggle for Global 
Dominance (London: Penguin UK, 2017), 265. The evidence, however, remains inconclusive at best. Michael Green et al., Countering Coercion in 
Maritime Asia: The Theory and Practice of Gray Zone Deterrence, Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 9, 2017, 85–90, https://www.
csis.org/analysis/countering-coercion-maritime-asia. On the detention of Japanese nationals, see: Smith, Intimate Rivals, 191; Hagström, “‘Power 
Shift’ in East Asia?” 281. Hagström suggests the timing could be coincidental.
97  M. Taylor Fravel, “Explaining China’s Escalation over the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands,” Global Summitry 2, no. 1 (2016): 24–37, https://doi.
org/10.1093/global/guw010.
98  Maehara, author’s interview. 
99  Sunohara, Antō, 16–17, 36.
100   Sunohara, Antō, 39–43.
101  Maehara, author’s interview.
102  Sunohara, Antō, 49; Zhang, Xin Zhongguo He Riben Guanxi Shi, 299.
103  Noda Yoshihiko, former prime minister, author’s interview, Tokyo, Sept. 5, 2017.
Japanese minister in charge of the Japanese Coast 
Guard at the time, subsequently claimed to be 
following an “arrest manual” inherited from a previous 
administration.98 Even if Maehara did see a chance to 
assert Japanese jurisdiction, little preparation was 
made for what to do afterwards. The Kan Naoto 
administration was left scrambling for ways to 
contain the damage, fearful of being forced to pay the 
political price for intervening in the legal process in 
order to end the incident.99 Facing increasing pressure 
from Beijing, a Japanese foreign ministry delegation 
gave a presentation to the local prosecutor’s office, 
ostensibly at the latter’s request.100 The following day, 
the prosecutor announced the captain’s release. As 
Maehara himself admits, the handling of the situation 
was a “mishmash” (chūtohanpa).101
Notably, both countries subsequently sought to 
mend the relationship. Kan met with Wen on the 
sidelines of a summit in October 2010, where both 
agreed to promote a mutually beneficial strategic 
relationship. When the triple disaster of March 11 
struck Japan in 2011 — the earthquake, tsunami, 
and meltdown at the Fukushima nuclear plant — 
Beijing expressed condolences and provided aid in 
an effort to improve relations.102 Preparations thus 
began to celebrate the 40th anniversary of Sino-
Japanese normalization. As Kan’s successor, Noda 
Yoshihiko, recalls, in 2011 he “had no premonition” 
that the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands would again become 
a problem.103
Consequently, when in April 2012 the mayor of 
Tokyo, Ishihara Shintaro, proposed purchasing the 
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islands, it was a development unwelcome to both 
governments. Ishihara was well known as a right-
wing nationalist and there were concerns he would 
provoke Beijing such that “Sino-Japanese relations 
would enter an extremely dangerous state.”104 To 
contain the situation, the new Noda administration 
began quietly exploring the possibility of preemptively 
buying the islands. Behind the scenes, it also reached 
out to Chinese officials, arguing it was better for the 
Japanese government to hold title to the islands. 
Initially, the Japanese government thought it might 
be making headway in gaining tacit acceptance from 
Beijing of this point.105 The hope was to surreptitiously 
transfer the islands’ ownership without any publicity. 
104  Yoshihiko, author’s interview.
105  Sunohara, Antō, 173–83, 253–55.
106   Sunohara, Antō, 189–91.
This plan failed, however, when in July 2012 a Japanese 
newspaper made the story front-page news and Noda 
was forced to publicly announce his plans to pursue 
a potential purchase.106 Compounding the damage, 
this announcement also coincided with an important 
wartime anniversary, the Marco Polo Bridge Incident 
in 1937 which had precipitated Imperial Japan’s full-
scale military invasion of China. Even still, the Chinese 
government only began meaningfully escalating 
its response in mid-August, suggesting it, too, had 
initially wished to handle the issue quietly. But 
despite the apparent initial intentions of both sides, 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands subsequently became a 
highly salient flashpoint. Yet it remains unclear why.
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The Three Dimensions 
of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands’ 
Increased Significance
In examining the evidence, three dimensions 
of the islands’ increased significance emerge as 
important in explaining how the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands have developed into the flashpoint they are 
today. Those dimensions are symbolic, domestic, 
and competitive. The initial catalyst for the islands 
to begin growing in significance was the 2010 
collision incident. The 2012 Japanese purchase of 
the islands exacerbated this even further.
The Symbolic Dimension
Surveying official statements, news reports, and 
comments from government officials regarding 
the islands, it becomes clear that the dispute over 
the islands rapidly came to implicate much more 
than their immediate, tangible value. Political 
scientists have long suggested that international 
relations are populated with a variety of 
intangible concerns. State actors care about 
reputation, status, prestige, and honor within the 
international community.107 In some cases, these 
are ends in themselves, such as, for instance, 
when international prestige satisfies a need for 
national self-esteem or a certain international 
status constitutes an important element of a 
state’s national identity. In other cases, they can 
be a means to an end — for example, in order 
to increase the international deference a state 
enjoys and ease its ability to achieve its desired 
outcomes.108 The pursuit of intangibles — such 
as reputation — may even stem from mistaken 
107  Allan Dafoe, Jonathan Renshon, and Paul Huth, “Reputation and Status as Motives for War,” Annual Review of Political Science no. 17 (May 
2014): 371–93, https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-071112-213421; T. V. Paul, Deborah Welch Larson, and William C. Wolhlforth, eds., Status in 
World Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, “Status Seekers: Chinese and 
Russian Responses to US Primacy,” International Security 34, no. 4 (Spring 2010): 63–95, https://doi.org/10.1162/isec.2010.34.4.63; Barry O’Neill, 
Honor, Symbols, and War (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Richard Ned Lebow, A Cultural Theory of International Relations 
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Reinhard Wolf, “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status 
Recognition,” International Theory 3, no. 1 (2011): 105–42, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1752971910000308.
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109  Shiping Tang, “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies 14, no. 1 (2005): 34–62, https://doi.
org/10.1080/09636410591001474; Jonathan Mercer, Reputation and International Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2010); Daryl Press, 
“The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats During the ‘Appeasement’ Crises of the 1930s,” International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004/2005): 
136–69, https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288043467478.
110  Reinhard Wolf, “Resentment in International Relations,” paper presented at the European Consortium for Political Research Workshop on 
Status Claims, Recognition, and Emotions in International Relations, Mainz, March, 2013; Khaled Fattah and K.M. Fierke, “A Clash of Emotions: 
The Politics of Humiliation and Political Violence in the Middle East,” European Journal of International Relations 15, no. 1 (2009), https://doi.
org/10.1177%2F1354066108100053; Paul Saurette, “You Dissin Me? Humiliation and Post 9/11 Global Politics,” Review of International Studies 32, 
no. 3 (2006): 495–522, https://www.jstor.org/stable/40072200; Richard Herrmann et al., “Images in International Relations: An Experimental Test 
of Cognitive Schemata,” International Studies Quarterly 41, no. 3 (September 1997): 403–33, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2600790.
111  Smith, Intimate Rivals, 59; Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2006), 260.
112  Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future? (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
113  Smith, Intimate Rivals, 95–96; Karl Gustafsson, “Recognising Recognition through Thick and Thin: Insights from Sino-Japanese Relations,” 
Cooperation and Conflict 51, no. 3 (2016): 255–71, https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010836715610594.
fears over how other states will evaluate a 
given state’s resolve.109 Such concerns may be 
particularly salient for state actors who believe 
their international standing does not reflect 
what they are due, or alternately, perceive their 
status and prestige to be slipping away. Apart 
from global concerns, there may also exist 
intangible concerns that are particular to certain 
relationships between specific states. These 
include not only particular fixations with relative 
status and hierarchy vis-à-vis key counterparts, 
but also historical resentments and grievances, 
stories of unrectified humiliation and betrayal, 
and even mutual suspicion and prejudices.110 
Even before 2010, Sino-Japanese relations 
had experienced various episodes of contention 
over intangible issues. In the early 2000s, issues 
concerning the legacies of Japanese aggression 
against China — the “history problem” as it is 
called — loomed large. In particular, Japanese 
Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro’s annual visits 
to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, where 14 
Japanese Class A war criminals are enshrined, 
were an especial irritant — by the end of his 
administration the top Chinese leadership refused 
to even meet with him.111 This was exacerbated, 
among other things, by disputes over textbook 
content and ongoing wartime compensation 
issues.112 Beijing’s official position was that Japan 
was not taking the proper attitude toward its 
history, while for many on the Japanese side, the 
Chinese government was also responsible for 
cynically playing up history and exaggerating the 
threat of Japanese militarism.113 Indeed, in a 2010 
poll, the majority of Chinese respondents blamed 
a lack of Japanese historical consciousness for the 
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history problem between the two countries, while 
Japanese respondents primarily blamed China’s 
anti-Japanese education.114 Nevertheless, these 
controversies over history played out primarily in 
the realm of rhetoric and, occasionally, protests — 
not military planning. The flare-up of the dispute 
over the islands, however, supplied these struggles 
over history a concrete focal point.115 
The official Japanese position is that the islands 
were terra nullis when declared Japanese territory 
in 1895. In the decades that followed, China did not 
challenge Japanese use of the islands, and neither 
did it object to U.S. administration of the islands 
after World War II. From the Japanese perspective, 
the Chinese government’s 1971 claim thus appeared 
suspicious so close on the heels of the publication 
of the U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East report suggesting the existence of 
significant petroleum deposits.116 In this view, by 
making a historical claim Beijing was duplicitously 
inserting itself into the game retroactively when it 
appeared there was material gain to be had, again 
twisting history to its own political ends.117 
The official Chinese position, however, is that 
China first discovered and administered the islands 
and that Japan only secretly incorporated them 
after gaining the upper hand in the 1894–1895 Sino-
Japanese War. The islands were thus Japanese 
spoils of war, ceded with Taiwan, and therefore 
subject to return under the 1945 terms of the 
Japanese surrender. But they were not returned, 
and the People’s Republic of China was excluded 
from the 1951 peace treaty process. Therefore, in 
1971, as the United States prepared to transfer the 
islands to Japan, Beijing made its position clear.118 
In this reading, Japan is again white-washing past 
aggression and distorting history, and has “rejected 
114  “Dai 6-kai nitchū kyōdō seronchōsa” [The Sixth Japan-China Joint Attitude Survey], Tokyo-Beijing Fōramu,  Aug. 12, 2010, http://tokyo-
beijingforum.net/index.php/survey/6th-survey.
115  For detailed analysis, see, Reinhard Drifte, “The Japan-China Confrontation Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands–Between ‘Shelving’ and ‘Dispute 
Escalation,’” Asia-Pacific Journal 12, no. 30 (2014), https://apjjf.org/2014/12/30/Reinhard-Drifte/4154/article.html.
116  “Senkaku Islands Q&A.”
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118  “Diaoyu Dao, an Inherent Territory of China,” The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, September 2012, http://english.gov.cn/
archive/white_paper/2014/08/23/content_281474983043212.htm.
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Discourse on Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands], Contemporary Japan and East-Asia Studies 2, no. 2 (2018): 17.
121  Takashi Okada, Senkaku Shotō Mondai: Ryōdo Nashyonarizumu No Miryoku [Senkaku Islands Problem: The Attraction of Territorial Nationalism] 
(Tokyo: Sososha, 2010), 3.
122  Both even use the same word, 固有 (Japanese: koyū, Chinese: guyou).
123  Giulio Pugliese and Aurelio Insisa, Sino-Japanese Power Politics: Might, Money and Minds (Springer, 2016); Michael Yahuda, Sino-Japanese 
Relations after the Cold War: Two Tigers Sharing a Mountain (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), 39–63.
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and challenged the outcomes of the victory of the 
World Anti-Fascist War.”119 
Granted, these diverging historical arguments 
existed prior to the 2010 incident, and were known 
to activists and specialists. With the dispute thrust 
into the limelight by the events of 2010 and 2012, 
however, the islands became implicated in the 
larger “history problem” for the domestic publics 
in both states, with all the perceptions of bad faith 
that entailed. 
The islands became more than just another 
vessel for historical disagreements, frustrations, 
and grievances, however. They also came to 
implicate higher matters of justice. In China, 
this is exemplified by a sudden uptick after the 
People’s Daily referred to Japan as “stealing” 
(qiequ) the islands in 2010.120 The language of theft 
was also used in Japan, where, as one Japanese 
commentator noted, the logic took the following 
pattern: The events triggered a “[the islands] ‘may 
be stolen’ victimhood-consciousness,” resulting in 
“an instantaneous ‘we cannot let [them] be stolen’ 
reflexive response.”121 Certainly, if, as each country 
insists, the islands are its “inherent” territory,122 
the other country cannot but have criminal intent 
and is acting unjustly.
All the above erupted against the larger backdrop 
of Sino-Japanese relations, in which China was seen 
in both countries as increasingly overshadowing 
Japan politically, economically, and militarily.123 
Notably, 2010 was the year China’s gross domestic 
product surpassed Japan’s, becoming second 
only to the United States’.124 Consequently, within 
Japan, Beijing’s conduct crystallized fears of how a 
stronger China might behave in the future: bullying 
and ignoring the rules and using its military 
and economic might to assert its prerogatives 
More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
27
in the region and beyond.125 Indeed, as Smith 
notes, in Japan the 2010 incident earned the title 
“Senkaku shokku [shock],” as it demonstrated 
how a “hostile” China might behave.126 Some in 
Japan even began suggesting a domino logic — 
“If we give them Senkaku, next it will be giving 
over Yonaguni Island or even the main island of 
Okinawa.”127 These concerns resonated with poll 
results revealing unfavorable popular perceptions 
of Chinese people more generally, likely influenced 
by recent negative press concerning poor behavior 
by mainland Chinese tourists in Japan as well as 
a high-profile scandal involving poisoned Chinese 
food imports, but also suggesting possible racist 
undertones of longer lineage within certain parts of 
the population.128 On the eve of the 2010 collision, 
only a small percentage of Japanese people 
reported viewing mainland Chinese as peaceful, 
altruistic, or trustworthy, and a majority in earlier 
polls described mainland Chinese people as greedy, 
nationalistic, and rude.129 All this further echoed 
and bled into larger anxieties over Japan’s place 
in the world given its declining population and 
internal malaise.130 
For Beijing, however, Japanese behavior belied 
the notion that other states would accord China 
greater respect in line with its growing strength. 
The inverse logic of the Chinese axiom “those 
who are backwards will be bullied”131 is that great 
powers should receive greater deference. Yet, 
from the official Chinese perspective, Japan was 
showing no such deference: It obstinately refused 
to acknowledge the dispute, unilaterally abrogated 
the implicit agreement between the two countries 
to shelve the issue, and repeatedly and flagrantly 
125   Smith, Intimate Rivals, 189–236; Shogo Suzuki, “The Rise of the Chinese ‘Other’ in Japan’s Construction of Identity: Is China a Focal Point of 
Japanese Nationalism?” Pacific Review 28, no. 1 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2014.970049; Hagström, “‘Power Shift’ in East Asia?” 
275–80.
126  Smith, Intimate Rivals, 189.
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Japanese Studies 35, no. 1 (2015): 23–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/10371397.2015.1006598.
129  “Dai 6-kai nitchū kyōdō seronchōsa” [The Sixth Japan-China Joint Attitude Survey], Tokyo-Beijing Fōramu, 2006, http://tokyo-beijingforum.net/
index.php/survey/6th-survey; “China’s Neighbors Worry About Its Growing Military Strength,” Pew Research Center, Sept. 21, 2006, 4, https://www.
pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2006/09/GAP-Asia-report-final-9-21-06.pdf.
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2017), 66.
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disregarded Beijing’s warnings.132 In the words of 
a general in the People’s Liberation Army, “Japan 
should view these warnings very clearly, today’s 
China is different from the China of the past.”133 
The China of the past may have been preyed upon 
due to its weakness, but the strong China of today 
deserved to have its wishes respected. That Japan 
did not do so spoke to larger suspicions in China 
that Japan “cannot acknowledge any other Asian 
country, cannot accept any other Asian country’s 
development, believes Japan should stand 
eternally at the head of the Asian powers.”134  This 
corresponded to more general views recorded in 
polls: Large majorities of Chinese respondents 
perceived the Japanese people as arrogant, 
nationalistic, and violent.135 
The islands thus became a symbol of something 
larger for both countries. In the words of a former 
high-ranking Japanese defense official, “it is not 
a struggle over economic interests … it is not 
something that would affect the military balance, 
and so what is left is honor—it is a nationalistic 
symbol.”136 Similarly, a former Japanese vice admiral 
stated that the islands “are a kind of psychological 
symbol … politically and psychologically we cannot 
allow China to take them.”137 Former Japanese 
ambassador Miyamoto Yūji framed the stakes even 
more poignantly: “We consider giving them up, 
what will they do next, does Japan really want to be 
a part of China, dominated by Chinese influence? … 
If Japanese lose the guts to defend the Senkaku, we 
become, ‘Yes, I follow your orders, China, king.’”138
Alternately, multiple Chinese interviewees 
in academia and at think tanks also privately 
conveyed the islands’ value to be neither strategic 
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nor economic, but primarily symbolic and 
political.139 As one scholar noted, the islands are 
worthless, but one cannot say so because the issue 
is too emotional. He continued, “The islands are 
emotionally important. They are just a few rocks, 
but we cannot back down. Japan took the islands 
when China was weak.”140 
In sum, following the 2010 incident, the dispute 
over the islands quickly became about much more 
than the islands themselves — they became concrete 
proxies in larger morally and emotionally charged 
struggles over history, reputation, recognition, 
victimization, and status. There is, therefore, an 
important symbolic dimension to the significance 
of the islands within Sino-Japanese relations. Their 
increased symbolic meaning elevated the dispute’s 
salience and raised the perceived stakes involved.
The Domestic Dimension
In examining how the dispute developed after 
the 2010 incident, it is equally impossible to ignore 
the domestic dynamics that were set into motion in 
both countries. Domestically, the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands became a major political football. Much 
has been made within the international relations 
literature of “outbidding,” whereby domestic 
political actors seek to raise their profile and 
political chances by taking hardline foreign policy 
positions.141 The conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands supplied an opportunity par excellence for 
such outbidding. Advocating harsher measures, 
domestic politicians and political activists were able 
139  Anonymous interviews, Beijing, June 18–July 5, 2017. 
140  Anonymous interview, Beijing, June 2017.
141  Michael Colaresi, Scare Tactics: The Politics of International Rivalry (Syracuse University Press, 2005), 20, 29–35
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to differentiate themselves from their competitors 
by playing to popular hawkish biases.142 
That said, for the leaders managing the territorial 
contest, the dispute over the islands constituted 
a point of exposure that domestic opponents 
could leverage on a domestic playing field that 
was not fully level. Not holding power, political 
opponents were at liberty to criticize without 
offering solutions or, alternately, to propose 
tactics that play well domestically regardless of 
their international ramifications. Importantly, the 
conflict also erupted at a difficult time for the 
leadership in both countries. The Democratic Party 
of Japan, a relatively new party without previous 
ruling experience, had assumed power. In China, a 
leadership struggle was underway. The conflict thus 
was a potential source of vulnerability for those 
in power and a potential 
source of ammunition for 
their critics. 
Within Japan, the ruling 
Democratic Party of Japan 
quickly came under fire 
for giving the appearance 
that the captain had been 
released due to pressure 
from Beijing. Linus 
Hagström has chronicled 
how policymakers, elites, 
and the press in Japan 
viewed the episode: 
“a diplomatic defeat,” “caved in to pressure,” 
“a humiliating retreat,” “a fiasco.”143 Above all, 
the Democratic Party of Japan was attacked as 
“spineless.”144 Even the Japanese ambassador in 
Beijing was criticized for responding to late-night 
summonses from the Chinese government.145 The 
opposition also called for the Democratic Party 
of Japan to release the coast guard footage of the 
incident to clarify who was at fault. Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Sengoku Yoshito argued the video was 
evidence and could not be made public, but this 
was ridiculed as deferring to Chinese sensibilities 
while Beijing spread untruths, such as the claim 
that the captain was innocent.146 Consequently, a 
coast guard official who had access to the video 
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and was angry with the Japanese government’s 
behavior leaked the footage.147 The leak, in turn, 
ignited a further controversy over the ruling party’s 
control of its own officials.148 The overall effect 
was a blow to the Democratic Party of Japan. As 
one parliamentarian who belonged to that party 
relates, after 2010, “we were in a different political 
climate … much of the criticism, or even I would 
say hatred towards the DPJ [Democratic Party of 
Japan] stems from that, that we were seen as being 
weak … almost having a collusive relationship with 
the Chinese.”149
This, in turn, set the stage for 2012. By announcing 
his plan to purchase the islands, Tokyo’s mayor, 
Ishihara, cast himself as defending the national 
interest where the Democratic Party of Japan 
had failed: “The government should buy them, 
but it doesn’t. Tokyo will defend the Senkaku.”150 
Ishihara was known for his antipathy toward the 
People’s Republic of China — frequently referring 
to it with the derogatory term shina.151 But this was 
also a political opportunity. As Noda observed, “He 
was the mayor of Tokyo, but after that he founds 
a new party, and becoming ambitious towards 
national politics, he may have been looking for 
something with which to appeal to the public.”152 
In the wake of 2010, that is exactly what happened: 
One early poll showed 69 percent support for 
Ishihara’s plan.153 The Liberal Democratic Party 
followed suit, adding the purchase of the islands 
to its manifesto.154 Ishihara quickly amassed a large 
number of public donations worth 1.4 billion yen, 
both increasing his leverage and making it difficult 
to back down.155 Ishihara was also quite cavalier 
about the risks. Speaking privately with Noda, he 
suggested that even if China were provoked to 
military action, things would be fine, because “if 
147  Masaharu Isshiki, Nani Ka No Tame Ni [For something] (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbun Chuban, 2011), 87.
148  Smith, Intimate Rivals, 207–09.
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it involves conventional forces, the Japanese Self 
Defense Forces would win.”156 
Afraid of what would happen should Ishihara 
purchase the islands, the Noda government thus 
entered into a covert contest with him to buy them 
first.  Although the Japanese government may 
eventually have sought ownership of the islands 
regardless so as to control their use, Ishihara 
accelerated its timeline, limited its options, and 
brought unwanted publicity.157 Complicating 
matters, the islands’ owner was slow and fickle, 
causing some drama as both sides sought to curry 
favor with him.158 Even after securing the owner’s 
agreement to sell, the Japanese government worried 
he might change his mind. Initially, the Japanese 
government was hopeful that its counterparts in 
Beijing might be amenable to its efforts. As events 
progressed, however, Japan’s top officials came to 
believe that Beijing would object irrespective of the 
timing and thus it would be better to finish with 
buying the islands quickly before the upcoming 
transition in China’s leadership.159 All the same, 
the forcefulness of the Chinese side’s response 
exceeded their expectations.160
Even with the purchase completed, the islands 
remained a prominent domestic political issue 
in Japan. In the September 2012 leadership race 
within the Liberal Democratic Party — which was 
playing out against the backdrop of violent Chinese 
protests — all candidates but one advocated 
increasing Japan’s “effective control of the islands.161 
Chief among these was Abe Shinzō, the victor, who 
proposed solidifying Japanese control by building 
a small harbor or structure to house officials on 
the islands.162 He continued a hawkish line going 
into the December lower-house elections, attacking 
the Democratic Party of Japan for “three years of 
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diplomatic failure.”163 The Liberal Democratic Party 
won, making Abe prime minister. In office, he has 
maintained a firm position, which arguably has 
played to his advantage as he has sought to increase 
Japanese defense spending and loosen legal 
restrictions on the Japanese Self Defense Forces.164 
Domestic dynamics within the People’s Republic of 
China are less clear, but internal political pressures 
also appear to have been at work. Scholars have long 
noted the importance of Sino-Japanese relations to 
the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, 
this being a domain of particularly strong perceived 
nationalist emotions.165 Nevertheless, prior to the 
2010 incident, the administration of President Hu 
Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao had been actively 
working to improve relations with Japan, reaching 
a controversial agreement to jointly develop oil and 
gas resources in the East China Sea. The agreement 
attracted internal domestic criticism and at the 
time was pushed through despite objections from 
members of various maritime security agencies.166 
The Japanese arrest of the fishing captain put Hu 
and Wen in a difficult position, as it suggested their 
concessions were for naught. Not surprisingly, the 
joint agreement was an early casualty of the 2010 
confrontation.167 Wen, in turn, became the face of 
China’s criticism of Japan, sharply attacking the 
arrest as “eliciting the anger of all Chinese at home 
and abroad.”168 
The incident also elicited domestic protests, 
although these were subject to official restraint.169 
Interestingly, in 2010, Chongqing was both one 
of the earliest sites of anti-Japanese protests 
and one of the last — the final demonstration 
occurred after the central government had begun 
officially discouraging protests.170 This protest was 
apparently tolerated by local authorities, given that 
calls for the rally had “circulated days in advance and 
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drawn international media coverage.”171 Although it 
was unclear at the time, we now know the Chinese 
Communist Party secretary of Chongqing at the 
time, Bo Xilai, was engaged in a fierce political 
struggle for a top leadership position. One of his 
methods of gaining support was an unorthodox 
campaign to foster mass popularity. That Bo might 
have sought to leverage the conflict for political 
gain is not inconceivable — it would have helped 
bolster even further his populist credentials while 
putting pressure on the center.
Bo eventually fell in 2012 — embroiled in a drama 
involving the murder of an expat. This scandal, 
along with the larger leadership succession 
struggle within the Chinese Communist Party 
prior to the 18th Party Congress, unfolded at the 
same time as Tokyo was moving closer to buying 
the islands. The Japanese purchase thus came 
at a very difficult time for Hu and Wen.172 As the 
then-Japanese ambassador recounts, from July 
2012 onward, Beijing repeatedly communicated to 
Tokyo that it should desist with efforts to purchase 
the islands, conveying the message: “The Party 
Congress is in November, this will be an extremely 
large problem.”173 
The exact details of the leadership struggle 
remain a mystery — including Xi Jinping’s sudden 
disappearance in September, officially due to a 
“back injury.”174 What is clear, however, is that a 
considerable hardening of Beijing’s position vis-à-
vis Tokyo occurred in mid-August 2012, following a 
Chinese Communist Party leadership conference in 
Beidaihe. Online censorship of nationalistic posts 
concerning the islands dropped precipitously 
starting August 18, and in mid-August Chinese 
authorities became more permissive toward 
nationalist activities, allowing demonstrations and 
attempts by Hong Kong activists to land on the 
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islands, even providing media coverage.175 Several 
Japanese scholars have argued that political 
adversaries used the dispute to attack Hu and gain 
leverage in the leadership struggle, with some even 
suggesting the demonstrations were part of a plot 
by the subsequently deposed security chief, Zhou 
Yongkang.176 Even if this was not the case, Hu likely 
was politically on his heels, with a close aide under 
fire for corruption.177 Consequently, it is doubtful 
he could have tolerated letting the contest with 
Japan become an additional source of vulnerability.
Unsurprisingly, when Hu encountered Noda at 
an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation conference 
on Sept. 9, 2012, he strongly conveyed Beijing’s 
objections. As Noda recalls, he approached Hu 
to give his condolences and offer support for a 
recent earthquake, but “not at all responding to 
that, what came back was ‘[we] absolutely cannot 
accept nationalization of the islands ….’”178 Hu’s 
warning did not dissuade Noda. The following 
day he announced the purchase of the islands. As 
the then-Japanese ambassador has observed, the 
timing “was a bit diplomatically rude.”179 For Hu, it 
was a clear attack on his authority.
For Hu’s successor Xi, however, it presented an 
opportunity and a crucial trial. Xi was reportedly 
charged with heading a leading small group — a 
key policy body reporting to the Politburo — to 
respond to the Japanese purchase.180 If true, this 
constituted an important test of his leadership 
abilities and offered Xi the chance to project 
strength in contrast to Hu. The safest course for 
him was arguably a harsh response, provided 
it did not escalate out of control. As there were 
already calls to increase patrols around the islands, 
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Xi could prove his mettle by supporting them, 
which apparently he did.181 Xi continued to take a 
hard line toward Japan in the years that followed, 
siding with the People’s Liberation Army in 2013 
— over objections from the foreign ministry — on 
the plan to establish an Air Defense Identification 
Zone over the disputed islands.182 The political 
logic makes sense: When he was first in office, 
Xi was embroiled in fierce domestic battles, most 
prominently the massive anti-corruption campaign 
that has become one of the defining elements of his 
rule. Taking a hardline stance prevented criticism, 
appealed to key constituencies in the military and 
security apparatuses, and bolstered his popularity 
as a strong leader. It would be two years before 
Xi would first meet Abe, and only after both sides 
had hammered out statements seemingly agreeing 
to disagree about the existence of a disagreement 
over the islands.183
The combination of vulnerability and opportunity 
therefore pressured leaders in both countries to 
adopt a harder line. But numerous minor actors 
on both sides — too many to list here — also saw 
opportunity in the conflict. This extended beyond 
the many nationalist activists on both sides who 
mobilized for the cause — online and in the 
streets — and the tabloids supplying sensationalist 
reporting. The conflict also became the subject of 
pulpy books for the general public, ranging from 
the People’s Liberation Army Rear Admiral Zhang 
Zhaozhong’s History of Disputed Islands to former 
Japanese Coast Guard official Isshiki Masaharu’s 
account of leaking the collision footage.184 
Conspiracy theorists also found an outlet, 
suggesting, for instance, that the 2010 collision 
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was a Chinese plot or that the death of a Chinese 
panda on loan to Japan was deliberate.185 Jiun Bang, 
in her excellent work on nationalist kitsch, has 
mapped the myriad ways private entrepreneurs in 
both Japan and China capitalized on the dispute.186 
Merchandise included stickers, keychains, shirts, 
food, and even alcohol — one example being the 
106-proof “Diaoyudoa patriotic liquor” available 
in an artillery-shell-shaped flask. Private investors 
even sought to purchase the trawler from the 2010 
collision to house a sarcastically named “Sino-
Japanese Friendship Restaurant.”187 In China, the 
conflict spawned videogames, from the cartoonishly 
racist “Protect Diaoyudao,”188 to the more realistic 
“Glorious Mission,” which was designed by the 
People’s Liberation Army.189 All served to further 
cement the dispute within the public sphere and 
raise its salience.
In sum, there has been a clear domestic 
dimension to the significance of the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands. Developments concerning the 
islands generated both opportunities for domestic 
political actors and private entrepreneurs and 
potential vulnerabilities for each country’s 
leadership. Those not in power had incentives to 
play up the drama and the intangible stakes of 
the contest for selfish ends — whether personal, 
ideological, or commercial. For those in power, 
the stakes of the contest — for better or worse — 
potentially included their own political fate. The 
overall impact domestically was to direct attention 
to the contest and exert pressure on policymakers 
to take ever stronger actions in response. 
The Competitive Dimension 
The 2010 incident — and the subsequent 
2012 purchase even more so — sparked not just 
immediate retaliatory gestures but also a variety 
of concurrent forms of positional competition 
between the two countries. Akin to the security 
dilemma, in which actions by one side to improve 
its security render the other side less secure, 
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here actions taken to improve one side’s position 
in the dispute were detrimental to the other’s, 
thus eliciting counter-measures. Such positional 
competition did not just take military form, 
it also unfolded within the domains of public 
diplomacy, legal contestation, and even historical 
research. Through move and counter-move, a 
set of interactive dynamics emerged that even 
now continue to propel escalation of the dispute 
forward. The islands are thus also significant in 
that they became a concrete, enduring target for all 
these positional struggles.
Things began with the disagreements over the 
Japanese arrest of the trawler captain and the 
subsequent purchase of the islands, both of which 
generated strong reactions from both countries. 
In response to the latter, in particular, Beijing 
launched a “diplomacy of anger,”190 expressing 
outrage, suspending meetings and exchanges, and 
taking various punitive measures. As one Chinese 
scholar writes, “to defend the sovereignty of the 
Chinese Diaoyu Islands, the Chinese government 
adopted a series of forceful countermeasures” 
ranging from sending maritime surveillance ships 
and aircraft into the area, to the official publication 
of basepoints and baselines around the islands, to 
even introducing daily televised weather forecasts 
for the islands.191 Beijing also permitted protests 
in over 200 cities, some involving violence and the 
destruction of stores, restaurants, and property 
associated with Japan.192 Japan, in turn, was host to 
various forms of activism, as well as protests and 
denunciations of China’s behavior.193 Although the 
vehemence of these immediate reactions appears 
to have subsided, both states also took further 
measures to solidify their respective standing in 
the dispute, setting in motion various forms of 
positional competition that remain ongoing.  
Military Competition
Perhaps the most prominent form of positional 
competition has been in the military — or 
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paramilitary — domain, whereby each side seeks 
advantage through acquiring and deploying 
relevant capabilities. Most strikingly, official 
Chinese vessels and aircraft have become a regular 
presence around the disputed islands, challenging 
Japanese control. Following the 2010 arrest of the 
Chinese trawler captain, Beijing successively sent a 
number of official vessels into the contiguous zone 
surrounding the islands. After the 2012 purchase, 
these increased markedly: Sixty-six patrols 
entered the islands’ territorial waters over the 
subsequent year.194 In the latter half of 2013, these 
stabilized into regular patrols two or three times 
per month,195 and were accompanied by increasing 
Chinese air patrols as well.196 The initial Japanese 
response was to shift half of its entire coast guard 
to the area surrounding the islands and keep up a 
constant pace of scrambling fighters to intercept 
approaching Chinese aircraft.197 
The longer-term response on both sides, however, 
has been a qualitative and quantitative increase in 
both the capabilities deployed in the immediate 
vicinity of the islands as well as the overall portfolio 
of capabilities that both sides possess. Beijing 
has steadily increased military spending and has 
also invested heavily in its paramilitary maritime 
forces.198 Certainly, this is a trend that predates 
2010 and involves a multitude of factors. But this 
spending includes capabilities that would be useful 
for a scenario involving the islands. Indeed, official 
Chinese ships appearing in adjacent waters have, of 
late, become larger and more militarily capable, with 
a number of Chinese navy vessels being repurposed 
as coast guard ships.199 Correspondingly, Japan has 
increased its military spending and responded with 
a variety of measures, including the construction of 
new Japanese Self Defense Forces and Japanese Coast 
Guard facilities on nearby islands, the creation of a 
“dedicated Senkaku Territorial Waters Guard Unit” 
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to maintain a “24/7 presence” around the islands, a 
50 percent increase in coast guard tonnage, and the 
creation of an amphibious force capable of retaking 
remote islands.200 Japan has also repeatedly sought 
U.S. support, receiving assurances that their defense 
agreement covers the islands and successfully 
seeking revisions to the bilateral defense guidelines 
so as to better respond to potential contingencies 
involving the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.201 
The overall consequence of the above developments 
is a much more crowded maritime environment 
coupled with a greater increase in the potential force 
both sides can bring to bear. As Adam Liff and Andrew 
Erikson note, “Despite … the fact neither Beijing nor 
Tokyo wants conflict, the post-2012 operational status 
quo has significantly increased the possibility of even 
an unintended miscalculation or incident.”202 There 
have been close encounters, including incidents in 
which Chinese military vessels have locked onto 
Japanese counterparts with fire-control radar and 
episodes of “mock dogfighting” between both sides 
in the air.203 As each state seeks to materially defend 
or improve its position, the potential danger of the 




However, the ongoing, interactive material 
competition is not the only one in play. Positional 
jockeying has also unfolded in the realm of public 
diplomacy, with each country appealing for 
support internationally. As the conflict proceeded, 
Beijing became particularly active in broadcasting 
its position — mobilizing diplomats to author 
op-eds in foreign newspapers, encouraging 
demonstrations abroad, releasing a new white 
paper, and creating a multi-language pamphlet 
for international distribution.204 Kitagami Keiro, 
an aide in Noda’s administration, recalled Noda 
presenting him the Japanese-language version 
of the pamphlet, saying, “one of my friends 
visited China for business purposes and they 
gave him this. … We have to give our side of 
the argument.”205 Consequently, Japan began 
producing its own pamphlets and videos, and 
diplomats were given orders to respond where 
possible — at the United Nations, at international 
conferences, and in the opinion pages of major 
foreign newspapers.206 At times, this bordered 
on the absurd, as when Chinese and Japanese 
diplomats in Britain traded public accusations as 
to which was more akin to Voldemort, the villain 
from the Harry Potter books.207 The core message 
each country endeavored to convey, however, was 
more serious. Beijing sought to portray Japan 
as an unrepentant, militaristic challenger to the 
post-World War II order, while Tokyo sought to 
portray itself as upholding a rules-based order in 
the face of broad Chinese revisionism in both the 
East and South China Seas.208
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Legal and Historical Contestation
The public diplomacy campaigns intersected 
with two other domains in which Sino-Japanese 
positional struggles were unfolding: those of 
legal contestation and historical scholarship. 
Legal imperatives, in particular, can have quite 
pernicious effects, motivating competitive 
“displays of sovereignty” to avoid any sign of 
acquiescence and to counter every move made 
by the other side.209 In particular, this has driven 
contests between Chinese and Japanese vessels 
over jurisdictional control in the waters off the 
islands. Legal argumentation also incentivizes each 
side to promote self-serving interpretations while 
denying any legitimacy to the position of the other, 
reinforcing a sense of self-righteous victimization. 
As noted above, the Japanese legal claim contends 
the islands were terra nullis and that, for decades, 
it exercised effective control with Chinese consent, 
while Beijing argues its legal claim on the basis 
of prior discovery and the Japanese conditions of 
surrender in 1945.210 Discrepancies between these 
justificatory histories feed the impression that 
each side’s national cause is just and the other’s 
is duplicitous. Thus, as both countries seek to 
legitimate their claims, they become cemented in 
positions ever less amenable to compromise. 
To supplement their legal claims, both 
countries have also resorted to competitive 
historical documentation and research. Each 
side has sought to support its position with 
historical maps, documents, and sympathetic 
scholarship.211 History has also been marshalled 
to fortify domestic support through historical 
exhibitions and updated textbooks.212 Historical 
argumentation can work in destabilizing ways, 
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however. For example, in 2013, two Chinese 
scholars published a piece in the People’s Daily 
arguing not only that the Diaoyu Islands belonged 
to Taiwan, but that even Japanese claims to the 
Ryukyu Islands had a troubled history.213 According 
to one of the authors, the goal was to point out, 
“If one says that the Ryukyus in early history were 
not part of Japan, what evidence does Japan have 
to prove that the Diaoyu Islands are Japanese 
territory[?]”214 Ostensibly intended to discredit 
Japanese claims to the islands as “inherent 
territory,” in Japan, the essay was interpreted 
much more ominously, with conservative papers 
proclaiming, “not just the Senkaku, China’s 
blatant intention to seize all of Okinawa has 
become visible.”215 The article only provided 
further confirmation of Chinese malevolence to 
hawks in Japan arguing that the islands were just 
the first domino. 
In short, the islands have also grown in 
significance as the focus of ongoing positional 
competition across a variety of domains. They 
act as a concrete object for both sides to continue 
to struggle over. As each side has mobilized its 
diplomats, soldiers, scholars, and lawyers for 
their respective efforts, the result has been ever 
hardening positions and more points of friction 
within Sino-Japanese relations. Even after the 
immediate tensions subsided, these various forms 
of competition have continued to unfold, shaping 
mutual perceptions and setting the stage for further 
tensions. Perhaps most crucially, these different 
forms of competition appear to be taking on lives 
of their own irrespective of the original value of 
the stakes involved. Indeed, it is, in general, not 
the place of those tasked with achieving positional 
advantage to question the aims — only to find the 
best way to execute their mandate. 
213  Zhang Haipeng and Li Guoqiang, “Lun maguantiaoyue and diaoyudao wenti” [Discussing the Treaty of Shimonoseki and the Diaoyu Islands 
Question], Renmin Ribao, May 8, 2013, 9.
214  “Renminribao kan wen zhiyi liuqiu guishu” [The People’s Daily publishes an essay questioning the ownership of the Ryukyus], Zhongguo 
guangbowang, accessed Sept. 11, 2018, http://china.cnr.cn/xwwgf/201305/t20130510_512557847.shtml.
215  “Chūgoku no Okinawa ronbun” [China’s Okinawa essay], Sankei Shinbun, May 10, 2013, 2.
216  Hassner, “The Path to Intractability”; Barbara Walter, “Explaining the Intractability of Territorial Conflict,” International Studies Review 5, no. 
4 (December 2003): 137–53, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3186399; Colaresi et al., Strategic Rivalries in World Politics; Monica Toft, “Indivisible 
Territory, Geographic Concentration, and Ethnic War,” Security Studies 12, no. 2 (2002): 82–119, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410212120010.
217  Sumit Ganguly and William Thompson, Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-Level Games (Redwood City, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 2011).
218  Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, “Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International Disputes,” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 46, no. 6 (2002), https://doi.org/10.1177%2F002200202237928.
219  Stacie Goddard, “Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy,” International Organization 60, no. 1 (January 2006): 
35–68, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818306060024.
Thinking in Three Dimensions
The recent increase in significance of the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands has three key dimensions. The first 
is the symbolic dimension, which consists of the 
expanding, intangible stakes that were projected 
onto the islands and elevated their prominence. 
The second, the domestic dimension, encompasses 
the ways in which the islands became a political 
football, generating increased internal pressure 
on leaders on both sides to take firmer measures. 
And the third is the competitive dimension, which 
refers to the role the islands have played as an 
object of various positional struggles that continue 
to unfold. Even as the relationship has now taken 
an apparent turn for the better, various forms of 
positional competition are still operative and a 
collision at sea or in the air could easily set off a 
new round of tensions. 
Unquestionably, the three-dimensional account 
outlined here draws significant inspiration from 
existing, process-focused strands within the 
literature on territorial disputes. First, it echoes 
approaches that highlight the symbolic dimension of 
territorial disputes, including concerns about rivalry, 
reputation, and symbolic entrenchment.216 But it does 
not promote any one concern — such as reputation 
— over the others, arguing that a multiplicity of 
intangible concerns have simultaneously been in 
play, including prejudices, moralized judgments, 
status issues, and resentment. Second, it builds on 
work that stresses the importance of the domestic 
dimension.217 But it does not treat these dynamics 
as necessarily more pronounced in democracies,218 
nor does it focus only on the domestic coalitions 
that involvement in these disputes engenders.219 
It additionally highlights how a wide variety of 
actors — journalists, academics, activists, and 
even economic opportunists — participated in 
elevating the domestic salience of the dispute. 
Lastly, it resonates with work that explores the 
interactive nature of disputes in terms of positional 
competition — whether this involves argumentation 
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or militarization — but broadens the focus to include 
the arenas of international public diplomacy, legal 
rationalization, and historical research.220 
Beyond this, however, it is crucial to note that 
none of the developments outlined above played 
out in isolation. Quite the contrary. At various 
times, when one facet of the islands’ significance 
increased, the other dimensions were affected as 
well. The island’s growing symbolic significance, 
for instance, rendered them more attractive for use 
as a domestic political football. Indeed, a variety of 
substate actors in the domestic realm — politicians, 
journalists, online commentators, demonstrators, 
even businesses producing nationalist kitsch such 
as “Diaoyu Beer,” sporting the exhortation to 
“drink the Diaoyu, strengthen your patriotism!”221 
— leveraged the symbolic import of the islands to 
their own ends. But at the same time, the symbolic 
meaning of the islands also grew in return as a 
result of their activism. Ishihara, in particular, was 
a key protagonist in this regard, stoking concerns 
that “before we know it, Japan could become the 
sixth star on China’s national flag.”222
The rising symbolic and domestic stakes attached 
to the islands, in turn, increased the weight of 
demands on policymakers to take firmer measures, 
both in the waters around the islands and in the 
arena of international public opinion. These actions, 
however, set in motion their own escalatory, 
interactive dynamics, generating additional points 
of friction.  The People’s Daily article on the 
“unresolved” status of Okinawa mentioned above is a 
prime example of this — an escalation in the realm of 
historical argumentation that provided ammunition 
to Japanese hawks while exacerbating more general 
Japanese concerns over China’s intentions. Moves 
such as this only served to further heighten the 
symbolic and domestic import of the islands.
Conversely, while counterfactuals are always 
problematic, there exists a strong logical argument 
that were one to have stripped away any one of 
these dimensions of the islands’ significance, 
events might have played out quite differently. 
Without the ineffable anxieties, frustrations, and 
resentments that became symbolically attached 
to the islands, the islands would arguably have 
been less salient a political issue for domestic 
opportunists to exploit. Here, too, Ishihara 
looms especially large. Had he not been able to 
leverage the issue for sizable donations and public 
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support, his threat to purchase the islands would 
have lacked credibility. Without the domestic 
significance of the islands as a source of political 
vulnerability — whether for the beleaguered 
Democratic Party of Japan government or during 
the troubled leadership transition in Beijing — both 
governments would have perhaps had more room 
to delay, downplay the issue, or seek alternative 
courses of action. Lastly, without the significance 
of the islands as a concrete and enduring focal 
point of positional jockeying that continues even 
now on multiple fronts, the potential risk of new 
cycles of conflict involving the islands would be 
significantly reduced. 
Conclusion
In many ways, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have 
played the role of what the famous British film 
director Alfred Hitchcock labeled a “MacGuffin” 
— an object that the protagonists of a narrative 
find themselves struggling to obtain. For instance, 
“in crook stories it is always the necklace and spy 
stories it is always the papers.” 223 For Hitchcock, 
the attributes of the MacGuffin were more or less 
irrelevant. The MacGuffin was only important 
because it gave the main characters something 
to fight over, thus driving the plot forward and 
rendering the film compelling. In Hitchcock’s words, 
“the logicians are all wrong in trying to figure out 
the truth of a MacGuffin, since it’s beside the point. 
… To me, the narrator, [it is] of no importance 
whatever.”224 Similarly, the argument here is that 
asking after the “truth” of the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
Islands, in terms of their prior strategic, economic, 
or historic value, is not of much analytical use. 
Rather, we should look to the roles they play in 
the larger story. They are significant within Sino-
Japanese relations as a symbol, a domestic political 
football, and an object of various forms of ongoing 
positional competition.
The purpose of this article has been to provide 
an evidence-based, theoretically informed account 
of how and why the contest over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands has turned into what it is. The 
three-dimensional approach taken here may apply 
to other disputes to greater or lesser degrees as 
well, and this could offer an interesting avenue for 
future research. But it should also be noted that the 
More Significance than Value: Explaining Developments in the Sino-Japanese Contest Over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands
37
contest over the islands is distinctly characterized 
by being initially unwelcome by both sides and 
seemingly detached from the actual, tangible stakes 
involved. Given the potential dangers implicated 
in this dispute, making sense of it is an important 
task in and of itself. Moreover, understanding the 
dynamics at work can help inform how we consider 
potential paths forward.
That said, there is no erasing the past. The 
politicized nature of the dispute means the options 
available for reversing the developments of the past 
several years are quite limited. However, one could 
endeavor to call public attention to the limited 
tangible worth of the islands. Taking into account 
both the tremendous value of stable economic and 
political relations between Japan and the People’s 
Republic of China, not to mention the massive 
potential damage even a minor armed clash over 
the islands might produce, the concrete value of 
the islands pales in comparison, especially in 
light of their relative unimportance for individual 
citizens’ lives and livelihoods. Framing the dispute 
in this manner would create political incentives to 
contain or shelve the conflict and work to detach 
the islands from the intangible significance they 
have come to accrue. But at the same time, there 
are parties on either side who might strongly 
push back against such attempts — and indeed, 
a number of China hawks already have225 — thus 
rendering this option decidedly difficult. 
And while recent efforts to set up crisis 
communication mechanisms are to be welcomed, 
more needs to be done to decrease the possibility 
of dangerous incidents in the vicinity of the islands. 
One avenue would be an agreement to mutually 
reduce or limit deployments to the area coupled 
with the explicit understanding that this would 
alter neither side’s legal position. Even better, 
declaring the islands and their territorial waters a 
mutually recognized nature sanctuary would offer 
good reason to keep ships out of the vicinity.226 
Currently, however, this option is unlikely to find 
much domestic support in either country. 
Whatever measures are taken, the eventual goal 
should be to return the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
to the periphery of Sino-Japanese relations. After 
all, despite the swirl of anxiety and resentment, 
political struggles and intrigue, and contests for 
military and diplomatic advantage, at the center of 
this dispute lies just a set of uninhabited rocks — 
rocks of questionable substantive value at that. 
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